TY - GEN

AU - Kaplan, David S.

AU - Sadka, Joyce

TI - Enforceability of Labor Law Evidence From A Labor Court In Mexico

PB - The World Bank

KW - Adjudication

KW - Assets

KW - Bankruptcy and Resolution of Financial Distress

KW - Confidence

KW - Corruption

KW - Finance and Financial Sector Development

KW - Information Security and Privacy

KW - Judicial process

KW - Judicial system

KW - Law and Development

KW - Lawyer

KW - Lawyers

KW - Legal Products

KW - Legal framework

KW - Microfinance

KW - Public Sector Corruption and Anticorruption Measures

KW - Trial

PY - 2008

N2 - The authors analyze lawsuits involving publicly-appointed lawyers in a labor court in Mexico to study how a rigid law is enforced. They show that, even after a judge has awarded something to a worker alleging unjust dismissal, the award goes uncollected 56 percent of the time. Workers who are dismissed after working more than seven years, however, do not leave these awards uncollected because their legally-mandated severance payments are larger. A simple theoretical model is used to generate predictions on how lawsuit outcomes should depend on the information available to the worker and on the worker's cost of collecting an award after trial, both of which are determined in part by the worker's lawyer. Differences in outcomes across lawyers are consistent with the hypothesis that firms take advantage both of workers who are poorly informed and of workers who find it more costly to collect an award after winning at trial

CY - Washington, D.C

UR - http://slubdd.de/katalog?TN_libero_mab2

ER -