TY - GEN

AU - Wei, Shang-Jin

TI - Does Corruption Relieve Foreign Investors of the Burden of Taxes and Capital Controls?

PB - The World Bank

KW - Capital Account

KW - Capital Control

KW - Capital Controls

KW - Currencies and Exchange Rates

KW - Debt Markets

KW - Domestic Capital

KW - Economic Theory and Research

KW - Emerging Markets

KW - Exchange

KW - Finance and Financial Sector Development

KW - Financial Institutions

KW - Foreign Direct Investment

KW - Foreign Firms

KW - Foreign Investment

KW - Foreign Investors

KW - Income

KW - International Economics & Trade

KW - International Investors

KW - Investment

KW - Investment and Investment Climate

KW - Macroeconomics and Economic Growth

KW - Price

KW - Private Sector Development

KW - Public Policy

KW - Share

KW - Tax

KW - Tax Rate

KW - Tax Rates

KW - Taxation and Subsidies

KW - Taxes

PY - 1999

N2 - October 1999 - Other things being equal, countries with higher tax rates, more corruption, or more restrictions on capital account transactions attract less foreign investment. Taxes and capital controls hinder foreign investment, and bureaucratic corruption adds to those burdens rather than reducing them. In a sample of 14 source countries making bilateral investments in 45 host countries, Wei finds that taxes, capital controls, and corruption all have large, statistically significant negative effects on foreign investment. Moreover, there is no robust support in the data for the efficient grease hypothesis - that corruption helps attract foreign investment by reducing firms' tax burden and the irritant of capital controls. This paper - a product of Public Economics, Development Research Group - is part of a larger effort in the group to study effective anticorruption strategies. It will appear as a chapter in a book on taxation and foreign direct investment edited by James Hines Jr. and to be published by the University of Chicago Press for the National Bureau of Economic Research. The author may be contacted at sweiworldbank.org

CY - Washington, D.C

UR - http://slubdd.de/katalog?TN_libero_mab2

ER -