author = { Johnson, Gregg B. AND Schwindt-Bayer, Leslie A. },

title = { Economic accountability in Central America },

publisher = {},

keywords = { Theorie , Bürger , wirtschaftliche Lage , Nicaragua , Honduras , repräsentative Demokratie , El Salvador , öffentliche Meinung , Panama , Modell , Präsident , Wirtschaftswachstum , Mittelamerika , Akzeptanz , Entwicklungsland , Guatemala , Costa Rica , Inflation , Wirtschaft , Verantwortung , Political science , Central America , presidential regimes , heads of state , economic situation , responsibility , social control , Ciencia política , América Central , sistema presidencialista , jefes de Estado , situación económica , responsabilidad , control social , Present , Centroamérica , Presente },

year = {2009},

abstract = {Veröffentlichungsversion},

abstract = {begutachtet (peer reviewed)},

abstract = {In: Journal of Politics in Latin America ; 1 (2009) 3 ; 33-56},

abstract = {Representative democracy hinges upon the notion of accountability. We examine the mediating effects of political context on economic accountability in a hostile environment – the developing democracies of Central America. We test whether clarity of responsibility mediates the economy's effects on citizens' support for a president using approval ratings. In general, we find that a good economy increases public support for a president significantly more under unified government, but surprisingly, we find that a bad economy decreases public support for a president far more under divided government. Dynamic simulations show that these effects become more pronounced during sustained periods of economic expansion or contraction.},

address = { },

url = { http://slubdd.de/katalog?TN_libero_mab2 }