%0 Generic

%T Promises, Promises Vote-Buying and the Electoral Mobilization Strategies of Non-Credible Politicians

%A Hanusch, Marek

%A Keefer, Philip

%I The World Bank

%D 2013

%X Vote-buying is pervasive, but not everywhere. What explains significant variations across countries in the greater use of pre-electoral transfers to mobilize voters relative to the use of pre-electoral promises of post-electoral transfers? This paper explicitly models the trade-offs that politicians incur when they decide between mobilizing support with vote-buying or promises of post-electoral benefits. Politicians rely more on vote-buying when they are less credible, target vote-buying to those who do not believe their political promises, and only buy votes from those who would have received post-electoral transfers in a world of full political credibility. The enforcement of a prohibition on vote-buying reduces the welfare of those targeted with vote-buying, but improves the welfare of all other groups in society

%C The World Bank

%C Washington, D.C

%U http://slubdd.de/katalog?TN_libero_mab2