Description:
Introduction -- Early descriptive theories -- Causal theories of reference -- Causal theories and cognitive significance -- Alternate theories -- Two-dimensional semantics -- Natural kind terms and rigidity -- The empty case -- Singular (de re) thoughts -- Indexicals -- Epistemology of reference -- References -- Part I: Early descriptive theories. The concept of linguistic reference before Frege -- Frege on reference -- Fregean descriptivism -- The referential-attributive distinction -- Part II: Causal theories of reference. The case(s) against descriptivism -- Fruits of the causal theory of reference -- The problem of reference change -- Part III: Causal theories and cognitive significance. Cognitive significance -- Conversational implicature in belief reports -- Context sensitivity and 'believes' -- A return to simple sentences -- Eliciting and conveying information -- Part IV: Alternate theories. Causal descriptivism -- Reference-fixing and presuppositions -- Names as predicates -- Variabilism -- Part V: Two-dimensional semantics. Two-dimensional semantics -- Two-dimensional semantics and identity statements -- Two-dimensionalism and the foundation of linguistic analysis -- A puzzle about assertion -- Part VI: Natural kind terms and rigidity. Rigidity of general terms -- The psychology of natural kind terms -- Pervasive externalism -- Theoretical identities as necessary and a priori -- The need for descriptivism -- The accommodation theory of reference -- Science, the vernacular and the 'qua' problem -- Part VII: The empty case. Mill and the missing referents -- Fregean theories of names from fiction -- Part VIII: Singular (de re) thoughts. Reference and singular thought -- Singular thoughts, sentences and propositions of that which does not exist -- Names and singular thought -- Part IX: Indexicals. How demonstratives and indexicals really work -- Demonstrative reference to the unreal: the case of hallucinations -- What is special about de se attitudes? -- De se attitudes and action -- Acting without me: corporate agency and the first person perspective -- Semantic monsters -- Part X: Epistemology of reference. Cross-cultural semantics at 15 -- Reference and intuitions -- The myth of quick and easy intuitions.