Description:
Indonesia presents an extremely rare quasi-experimental research case: the constitutional reforms and the transition to full presidentialism have effected a presidentialization of political parties that is largely in line with the changes predicted by the model of Samuels and Shugart [2010. Presidents, parties and prime ministers: How separation of powers affects party organization and behaviour. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press]. Especially the rise of the new president and his difficult relationship with his own party are testimony to this. But a closer look reveals that the model has to be adapted to Indonesian politics. Presidents have tools to forge grand coalitions and to overcome the dualism to an extent. The size and history of political parties as well as wider socio-economic changes, that is an increasing oligarchization of party organization, have to be considered. Moreover, highly personalized vehicle parties serving the interests of a presidential candidate have emerged. It follows that institutional and structural incentives combined have produced a party system consisting of different party types.