Working Paper Series, Bravo Center
[VerfasserIn]
;
Markussen, Thomas
[Sonstige Person, Familie und Körperschaft];
Putterman, Louis
[Sonstige Person, Familie und Körperschaft]
Governing Collective Action in the Face of Observational Error
Anmerkungen:
Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments August 2017 erstellt
Beschreibung:
We present results from a repeated public goods experiment where subjects choose by vote one of two sanctioning schemes: peer-to-peer (informal) or centralized (formal). We introduce, in some treatments, a moderate amount of noise (a 10 percent probability that a contribution is reported incorrectly) affecting either one or both sanctioning environments. We find that the institution with more accurate information is always by far the most popular, but noisy information undermines the popularity of peer-to-peer sanctions more strongly than that of centralized sanctions. This may contribute to explaining the greater reliance on centralized sanctioning institutions in complex environments