Anmerkungen:
Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments June 10, 2022 erstellt
Beschreibung:
Payoff security combined with reciprocal upper semicontinuity is sufficient for better-reply security, and consequently for the existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in compact, quasiconcave games by Reny's (1999) theorem. Analogously, diagonal payoff security combined with upper semicontinuity of the diagonal payoff function has been widely understood to be sufficient for diagonal better-reply security, and consequently for the existence of a symmetric pure strategy Nash equilibrium in compact, diagonally quasiconcave, quasi-symmetric games. We show by example that this is incorrect. Specifically, diagonal better-reply security may fail to hold, and a symmetric pure strategy equilibrium may fail to exist, if some player's payoff function lacks lower semicontinuity, with respect to the opponents' symmetric strategy profile, at all strategy profiles reached from a non-equilibrium profile on the diagonal by a unilateral better response of that player. These difficulties disappear, both in the game and in its mixed extension, if the lower bound on a player's payoff in the definition of diagonal payoff security is raised to reflect the higher levels that arbitrary better responses may achieve. We also discuss the relationship between our strengthened condition and diagonal payoff security