Beschreibung:
<jats:title>Abstract</jats:title><jats:p>The expansion of global trade has produced new challenges for the effective governance of product safety. We argue that many of these challenges arise at the bilateral level from the interaction of more or less adaptable national regulatory styles. When regulatory styles are unadaptable they produce gaps in risk management, slow and contested resolutions to crises, and limited regulatory cooperation. To examine these claims empirically, we study bilateral food safety regulation in four major exporter–importer dyads: <jats:styled-content style="fixed-case">C</jats:styled-content>hina–<jats:styled-content style="fixed-case">J</jats:styled-content>apan; <jats:styled-content style="fixed-case">C</jats:styled-content>anada–United States (<jats:styled-content style="fixed-case">US)</jats:styled-content>, <jats:styled-content style="fixed-case">C</jats:styled-content>hina–European Union (<jats:styled-content style="fixed-case">EU)</jats:styled-content>, and the <jats:styled-content style="fixed-case">US</jats:styled-content>–<jats:styled-content style="fixed-case">J</jats:styled-content>apan. The <jats:styled-content style="fixed-case">C</jats:styled-content>hina–<jats:styled-content style="fixed-case">J</jats:styled-content>apan dyad is the most adaptable, combining <jats:styled-content style="fixed-case">C</jats:styled-content>hina's “export segmentation” regulatory style with <jats:styled-content style="fixed-case">J</jats:styled-content>apan's strongly “risk‐averse, interventionist” style. The <jats:styled-content style="fixed-case">C</jats:styled-content>anada–<jats:styled-content style="fixed-case">US</jats:styled-content> dyad operates effectively, bringing together <jats:styled-content style="fixed-case">C</jats:styled-content>anada's “global market–conforming” regulatory style with the <jats:styled-content style="fixed-case">US</jats:styled-content> strategy of “sovereign regulator.” The <jats:styled-content style="fixed-case">C</jats:styled-content>hina–<jats:styled-content style="fixed-case">EU</jats:styled-content> dyad is less adaptable because the <jats:styled-content style="fixed-case">EU</jats:styled-content>'s “harmonization” regulatory style makes it difficult for the <jats:styled-content style="fixed-case">EU</jats:styled-content> to adapt to the weaknesses of the <jats:styled-content style="fixed-case">C</jats:styled-content>hinese food safety system. Finally, the <jats:styled-content style="fixed-case">US</jats:styled-content>'s sovereign regulator style clashes with <jats:styled-content style="fixed-case">J</jats:styled-content>apan's interventionist style, making them the least adaptable of the four dyads. The paper concludes with a discussion of the broader relevance of our findings for the development of regulatory capitalism.</jats:p>