• Media type: E-Book
  • Title: Maximum-revenue tariffs versus free trade
  • Contributor: Collie, David R. [VerfasserIn]
  • imprint: Cardiff, United Kingdom: Cardiff Business School, Cardiff University, March 2018
  • Published in: Cardiff economics working papers ; 201808
  • Extent: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 10 Seiten)
  • Language: English
  • Identifier:
  • Keywords: Graue Literatur
  • Origination:
  • Footnote:
  • Description: Welfare with the maximum-revenue tariff is compared to free-trade welfare under perfect competition in the case of a large country able to affect its terms of trade; under Cournot duopoly with differentiated products; and under Bertrand duopoly with differentiated products. Under perfect competition, assuming linear demand and supply, welfare with the maximum-revenue tariff will be higher than free-trade welfare if the country has sufficient market power. Under Cournot duopoly and Bertrand duopoly, assuming linear demands and constant marginal costs, welfare with the maximum-revenue tariff is always higher than free-trade welfare.
  • Access State: Open Access