Published:
Cambridge, Mass: National Bureau of Economic Research, October 2013
Published in:NBER working paper series ; no. w19531
Extent:
1 Online-Ressource
Language:
English
DOI:
10.3386/w19531
Identifier:
Reproduction note:
Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers
Origination:
Footnote:
Mode of access: World Wide Web
System requirements: Adobe [Acrobat] Reader required for PDF files
Description:
We propose a model of dynamic trading where a strategic high frequency trader receives an imperfect signal about future order flows, and exploits his speed advantage to optimize his quoting policy. We determine the provision of liquidity, order cancellations, and impact on low frequency traders as a function of both the high frequency trader's latency, and the market volatility. The model predicts that volatility leads high frequency traders to reduce their provision of liquidity. Finally, we analyze the impact of various policies designed to potentially regulate high frequency trading