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Plott, Charles [Other]; Smith, Vernon L. [Other]

Handbook of experimental economics results - [1st ed.]

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  • Media type: E-Book
  • Title: Handbook of experimental economics results : volume 1
  • Contains: Abbreviated Contents. Introduction; Markets; Market Economics of Uncertainty and Information; General Equilibrium and the Economics of Multiple Market Systems; Games; Mechanism Design and Policy Applications; Non Market and Organizational Research; Individual Choice, Beliefs and Behavior; Methods.
    Part 1.3.Dynamics of market adjustments.Ch. 26.Principles of market adjustment and stability / Charles R. Plott ;Ch. 27.Off-floor trading, market disintegration and price volatility in bid-ask markets
    Part 5.Mechanism design and policy applicationsPart 5.1.Abstract, theory driven.Ch. 67.Incentive-compatible mechanisms for pure public goods :a survey of experimental research / Yan Chen
    Part 6.Non-market and organizational research.Part 6.1.Public goods, externalities and common pools.Ch. 82.Partners versus strangers :random rematching in public goods experiments / James Andreoni and Rachel Croson
    Part 6.3.Behavior and organizations.Ch. 96.Growing organizational culture in the laboratory / Colin F. Camerer and Roberto Weber
    Part 1.MarketsPart 1.1.Institutional environmentsPart 1.1.1.Properties of the double auction.Ch. 1.Properties of disequilibrium adjustment in double auction markets / Charles R. Plott ;Ch. 2.From market jaws to the Newton method :the geometry of how a market can solve systems of equations
    Part 3.General equilibrium and the economics of multiple market systems.Ch. 41.Comparative advantage and international trade / Charles R. Plott
    Part 2.Market economics of uncertainty and information.Ch. 35.Learning to forecast rationally / Hugh Kelley and Daniel Friedman
    Ch. 36.Laboratory tests of job search models / James C. Cox and Ronald L. Oaxaca
    Ch. 37.Reciprocity and contract enforcement / Simon Gächter and Ernst Fehr
    Ch. 38.Reciprocity in experimental markets / Ernst Fehr and Armin Falk
    Ch. 39.Information cascade experiments / Lisa R. Anderson and Charles A. Holt
    Ch. 40.Markets and information aggregation mechanisms / Kay-Yut Chen and Charles R. Plott.
    Ch. 68.The combinatorial auction / Stephen J. Rassenti and Vernon L. Smith
    Part 5.2.Applied, problem driven.Ch. 69.Share trading and coupon banking interact to improve performance in emission trading markets / Stuart Mestelman and R. Andrew Muller
    Ch. 70.Trading institutions and emission allowances / Timothy N. Cason
    Ch. 71.Procurement contracting / James C. Cox and R. Mark Isaac
    Ch. 72.Electric power market design issues and laboratory experiments / Stephen Rassenti and Vernon Smith
    Ch. 73.Energy, reserve and adjustment market behavior with industry network, demand and generator parameters / mark A. Olson, Stephen Rassenti and Vernon L. Smith
    Ch. 74.Transmission constraints, incentive auction rules and trader experience in an electric power market / Steven Backerman, Stephen Rassenti and Vernon L. Smith
    Ch. 75.A smart market for the spot pricing and pricing of transmission through a power grid / Hung-Po Chao and Charles R. Plott
    Part 5.3.From the lab to the field.Ch. 76.Asset market manipulation :a field experiment with racetrack betting / Colin F. Camerer
    Ch. 77.Pre-testing international climate change policies :methods and results / Peter Bohm
    Ch. 78.Quasi-experimental evaluation of regional employment subsidies / Peter Bohm
    Ch. 79.Field-test elicitations of demand for public goods / Peter Bohm
    Ch. 80.Results from a dozen years of election futures markets research / Joyce Berg ... [et al.]
    Ch. 81.Experimental evidence on the existence of hypothetical bias in value elicitation methods / Glenn W. Harrison and E. Elisabet Rutström.
    Ch. 83.Differentiating altruism and reciprocity / Rachel T.A. Croson
    Ch. 84.Voluntary provision of public goods :experimental results with interior Nash equilibria / Susan K. Laury and Charles A. Holt
    Ch. 85.Spiteful behavior in voluntary contribution mechanism experiments / Tatsuyoshi Saijo
    Ch. 86.Explaining the comparative statics in step-level public good games / Arthur Schram, Theo Offerman and Joep Sonnemans
    Ch. 87.Cooperation in VCM experiments :results using the contribution function approach / Jordi Brandts and Arthur Schram
    Ch. 88.Voluntary provision of public goods / Kenneth S. chan, Stuart Mestelman and R. Andrew Muller
    Ch. 89.Intrinsic motivation in a public good environment / Frans van Winden, Frans van Dijk and Joep Sonnemans
    Ch. 90.Theoretical explanations of treatment effects in voluntary contributions experiments / Charles A. Holt and Susan K. Laury
    Part 6.2.Committees and voting groups.Ch. 91.Institutional modifications of majority rule / William P. Bottom ... [et al.]
    Ch. 92.Endogenous properties of equilibrium and disequilibrium in spatial committee games / Rick K. Wilson
    Ch. 93.Structure induced equilibrium in spatial committee games / Rick K. Wilson
    Ch. 94.Three-way experimental election results :strategic voting, coordinated outcomes and Duverger's law / Thomas Rietz
    Ch. 95.Participation game experiments :explaining voter turnout / Joep Sonnemans and Arthur Schram.
    Part 7.Individual choice, beliefs and behavior.Ch. 97.Motivation theory and experimental behavior under the decision cost hypothesis / Vernon L. Smith and James M. Walker
    Ch. 98.Intertemporal choice under habit formation / Ernst Fehr and Peter K. Zych
    Ch. 99.Preference reversal :now you see it, now you do not! / Peter Bohm
    Ch. 100.The endowment effect :evidence of losses valued more than gains / Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch and Richard H. Thaler
    Ch. 101.The endowment effect / Prveen Kujal and Vernon L. Smith
    Ch. 102.The Becker-DeGroot-Marschak mechanism is not generally incentive-compatible in practice / Peter Bohm
    Ch. 103.Utility maximization / James C. Cox
    Ch. 104.Preference reversals / James C. Cox
    Ch. 105.Rationality the fast and frugal way :introduction / Gerd Gigerenzer and Peter M. Todd
    Ch. 106.The recognition heuristic and the less-is-more effect / Daniel G. Goldstein and Gerd Gigerenzer
    Ch. 107.The recognition heuristic :a fast and frugal way to investment choice? Andreas Ortmann ... [et al.]Ch. 108.One-reason decision making / Gerd Gigerenzer ... [et al.]
    Ch. 109.Cognitive illusions reconsidered / Gerd Gigerenzer ... [et al.]
    Ch. 110.Social heuristics / Peter M. Todd, Jörg Rieskamp and Gerd Gigerenzer
    Ch. 111.Payoff scale effects and risk preference under rael and hypothetical conditions / Susan K. Laury and Charles A. Holt
    Ch. 112.Rewards and behavior in first price auctions / Vernon L. Smith and James M. Walker
    Ch. 113.Men, women and risk aversion :experimental evidence / Cahterine C. Eckel and Philip J. Grossman
    Part 8.Methods.Ch. 114.Experimetrics :the use of market experiments to evaluate theperformance of econometric estimators / James C. Cox and Ronald L. Oaxaca
    Ch. 115.On the performance of the lottery procedure for controlling risk preferences / Joyce E. Berg, Thomas A. Rietz and John W. Dickhaut.
    Part 1.1.2.Properties of posted offer processes.Ch. 6.Fairness and short run price adjustment in posted offer markets / Praveen Kujal and Vernon L. Smith ;Ch. 7 :Mixed strategy Nash equilibrium predictions as a means of organizing behavior in posted-offer market experiments
    Part 1.1.3.Call markets and sealed bids.Ch. 10.Strategy-proof equilibrium behavior in two-sided auctions / Vernon L. Smith ;Ch. 11.First price independent private values auctions
    Part 1.1.4.Alternative market institutions.Ch. 12.The Walrasian auction / Corinne Bronfman ... [et al.] ;Ch. 13.The matching market institution
    Part 1.2.Imperfect competitionPart 1.2.1. Market power.Ch. 15.Wage differentials in experimental efficiency wage markets / Ernst Fehr and Simon Gächter ;Ch. 16.The paradox of power / Yvonne Durham, Jack Hirshleifer and Vernon L. Smith ;Ch. 17.The exercise of market power in laboratory experiments
    Part 1.2.2.Collusion.Ch. 20.Price signaling and "cheap talk" in laboratory posted offer markets / Timothy N. Cason ;Ch. 21.The effects of collusion in laboratory experiments
    Part 1.2.3.Non-convexities.Ch. 24.Non-convexities, economies of scale, natural monopoly and monopolistic competition / Charles R. Plott ;Ch. 25.Avoidable cost structures and competitive market institutions
    Ch. 42.Asset pricing / Peter Bossaerts
    Ch. 43.Price discovery and allocation in chains and networks of markets / Charles R. Plott and Jackie Yeung
    Ch. 44.Multiple market systems and the classical principles of price dynamics in general equilibrium / Charles R. Plott
    Part 4.GamesPart 4.1.Accuracy of the Nash model.Ch. 45.Experimental beauty contest games :levels of reasoning and convergence to equilibrium / Rosemarie Nagel
    Ch. 46.Reciprocity in ultimatum and dictator games :an introduction / Elizabeth Hoffman, Kevin McCabe and Vernon Smith
    Ch. 47.Preferences and property rights in ultimatum and dictator games / Elizabeth Hoffman, Kevin McCabe and Vernon Smith
    Ch. 48.Prompting strategic reasoning increases Other-regarding behavior / Elizabeth Hoffman, Kevin McCabe and Vernon Smith
    Ch. 49.Social distance and reciprocity in dictator games / Elizabeth Hoffman, Kevin McCabe and Vernon Smith
    Ch. 50.Fairness in ultimatum bargaining / J. Keith Murnighan
    Ch. 51.Coordination failure in market statistic games / John van Huyck and Raymond Battalio
    Ch. 52.The problem of common choice in symmetric N -person coordination games / Carl M. Rhodes and Rick K. Wilson
    Ch. 53.Equilibrium convergence in normal form games / Nicole Bouchez and Daniel Friedman
    Ch. 54.Analyzing choice with revealed preference :is altruism rational? / James Andreoni and John H. Miller
    Ch. 55.Testing theories of Other-regarding behavior :a sequence of four laboratory studies / Gary E. Bolton ... [et al.]
    Ch. 56.Focal points and bargaining / Ken Binmore and Joseph Swierzbinski
    Part 4.2.Alternatives to Nash.Ch. 57.Differences in the economic decisions of men and women :experimental evidence / Catherine C. Eckel and Philip J. Grossman
    Ch. 58.Emergent conventions in evolutionary games / John van Huyck
    Ch. 59.Self-centered fairness in games with more than two players / Gary E. Bolton and Axel Ockenfels
    Ch. 60.Quantal response equilibria :a brief synopsis / Richard D. McKelvey and Thomas R. Palfrey
    Ch. 61.Logit equilibrium models of anomalous behavior :what to do when the Nash equilibrium says one thing and the data say something else / Simon P. Anderson, Jacob K. Goeree and Charles A. Holt
    Part 4.3.Learning in games.Ch. 62.Asymmetric two-person bargaining under incomplete information :strategic play and adaptive learning / Amnon Rapoport, Terry E. Daniel and Darryl A. Seale
    Ch. 63.The effect of message space size on learning and outcomes in sender-receiver games / Andreas Blume, Douglas V. Dejong and Geoffrey B. Sprinkle
    Ch. 64.Learning in entry limit pricing games / David J. Cooper
    Ch. 65.Payoff uncertainty and cooperation in finitely-repeated prisoner's dilemma games / Lawrence M. Kahn and J. Keith Murnighan
    Ch. 66.Learning and equilibrium in games / Colin F. Camerer, Teck H. Ho and Juin-Kuan Chong.
    Front cover; Handbook of Experimental Economics Results; Copyright page; Introduction to the Series; Preface; Introduction; The Book Organization; References; Contents of Volume 1; Part 1: Markets; 1. Markets; References; Part 1.1: Institutional Environments; Part 1.1.1: Properties of the Double Auction; Chapter 1. Properties of Disequilibrium Adjustment in Double Auction Markets; References; Chapter 2. From Market Jaws to the Newton Method: The Geometry of How a Market Can Solve Systems of Equations; References
    Chapter 3. Exogenous Uncertainty Increases the Bid-Ask Spread in the Continuous Double Auction1. Experimental Design; 2. Exogenous Uncertainty and the Bid/Ask Spread; 3. Conclusion; References; Chapter 4. Zero-Intelligence Robots and the Double Auction Market: A Graphical Tour; 1. Environment; 2. Robot Agents; 3. Literature - Robots and the Double Auction; References; Chapter 5. Effect of Non-binding Price Controls in Double Auction Trading; 1. Introduction; 2. Experimental Design; 3. Experimental Results; 4. Why Do Non-binding Price Controls Interfere with the DA Market Process?
    5. ConclusionsReferences; Part 1.1.2: Properties of Posted Offer Processes; Chapter 6. Fairness and Short Run Price Adjustment in Posted Offer Markets; 1. Introduction; 2. Market Experiments; 3. Hypothesis and Experimental Results; 4. Discussion; References; Chapter 7. Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium Predictions as a Means of Organizing Behavior in Posted-Offer Market Experiments; 1. Introduction; 2. Equilibrium Mixed Strategy Pricing Distributions; 3. Pricing Performance with Market Power; 4. Pricing Densities Relative to Static Nash Equilibrium Predictions
    5. Performance of Alternative Theories6. Summary; References; Chapter 8. Simulated and Real Buyers in Posted Offer Markets; 1. Introduction; 2. Summary of the Experimental Design; 3. Results; Acknowledgements; References; Chapter 9. The Performance of Double-Auction and Posted-Offer Markets with Advance Production; References; Part 1.1.3: Call Markets and Sealed Bids; Chapter 10. Strategy-Proof Equilibrium Behavior in Two-Sided Auctions; 1. Strategy-Proof Equilibria in the Sealed Bid-Offer Auction; 2. Strategy-Proof Equilibria in the Uniform Price Double Auction (UPDA); 3. Summary; References
    Chapter 11. First Price Independent Private Values Auctions1. Tests of the RNM with Market Prices; 2. Tests of the RNM with Subject Payoff Data; 3. Tests of the CRRAM and the RNM with Individual Bid Data; 4. Tests of the LCM with Individual Bid Data; 5. Summary of the Test Results; Acknowledgement; References; Part 1.1.4: Alternative Market Institutions; Chapter 12. The Walrasian Auction; 1. Introduction; 2. Experimental Environments; 3. Walrasian Auction Design and Computerized Implementation; 4. Experimental Results; References; Chapter 13. The Matching Market Institution
    1. Experimental Procedures
  • Contributor: Plott, Charles [Other]; Smith, Vernon L. [Other]
  • Published: Amsterdam; Oxford: North Holland, 2008
    Amsterdam: Elsevier [Online-Anbieter], 2008
    Online-Ausg.
  • Published in: Handbooks in economics 1574-0722 ; 28
    Handbooks in economics ; 28
  • Issue: 1st ed.
  • Extent: Online Ressource (xliii, 1097, 31 pages); illustrations (some color)
  • Language: English
  • ISBN: 0080887961; 9780080887968; 9780444826428; 0444826424
  • RVK notation: QB 100 : Reichweite und Methoden der Wirtschaftswissenschaften
  • Keywords: Experimentelle Wirtschaftsforschung
    Wirtschaftswissenschaften > Methodologie > Experiment
    Wirtschaftsforschung > Methodologie
  • Type of reproduction: Online-Ausg.
  • Origination:
  • Footnote: Includes bibliographical references and index. - Print version record
  • Description: Experimental methods in economics respond to circumstances that are not completely dictated by accepted theory or outstanding problems. While the field of economics makes sharp distinctions and produces precise theory, the work of experimental economics sometimes appear blurred and may produce results that vary from strong support to little or partial support of the relevant theory. At a recent conference, a question was asked about where experimental methods might be more useful than field methods. Although many cannot be answered by experimental methods, there are questions that can only be answered by experiments. Much of the progress of experimental methods involves the posing of old or new questions in a way that experimental methods can be applied. The title of the book reflects the spirit of adventure that experimentalists share and focuses on experiments in general rather than forcing an organization into traditional categories that do not fit. The emphasis reflects the fact that the results do not necessarily demonstrate a consistent theme, but instead reflect bits and pieces of progress as opportunities to pose questions become recognized. This book is a result of an invitation sent from the editors to a broad range of experimenters asking them to write brief notes describing specific experimental results. The challenge was to produce pictures and tables that were self-contained so the reader could understand quickly the essential nature of the experiments and the results

    Experimental methods in economics respond to circumstances that are not completely dictated by accepted theory or outstanding problems. While the field of economics makes sharp distinctions and produces precise theory, the work of experimental economics sometimes appear blurred and may produce results that vary from strong support to little or partial support of the relevant theory. At a recent conference, a question was asked about where experimental methods might be more useful than field methods. Although many cannot be answered by experimental methods, there are questions that can only be answered by experiments. Much of the progress of experimental methods involves the posing of old or new questions in a way that experimental methods can be applied. The title of the book reflects the spirit of adventure that experimentalists share and focuses on experiments in general rather than forcing an organization into traditional categories that do not fit. The emphasis reflects the fact that the results do not necessarily demonstrate a consistent theme, but instead reflect bits and pieces of progress as opportunities to pose questions become recognized. This book is a result of an invitation sent from the editors to a broad range of experimenters asking them to write brief notes describing specific experimental results. The challenge was to produce pictures and tables that were self-contained so the reader could understand quickly the essential nature of the experiments and the results