You can manage bookmarks using lists, please log in to your user account for this.
Media type:
E-Book
Title:
The Interaction of Monetary Policy and Wage Bargaining in the European Monetary Union
:
Lessons from the Endogenous Money Approach
Contains:
Cover; Contents; List of Figures; List of Tables; Acknowledgements; 1 Introduction: The Unsolved Unemployment-Inflation Puzzle; 2 Bargaining Structures and the Central Bank: Literature and Empirics; 3 The Real Balance Effect: Shortcomings; 4 Monetary Policy Transmission in a World of Endogenous Money; 5 Output and Prices in a World Without the Real Balance Effect; 6 The Central Bank: Restrictions in a World of Endogenous Money; 7 The Optimal Policy Mix and Logic of a Social Pact; 8 Conclusions and Outlook; Appendices: Monetary and Wage Policy in Standard Models; Notes and References
Cover; Contents; List of Figures; List of Tables; Acknowledgements; 1 Introduction: The Unsolved Unemployment-Inflation Puzzle; 2 Bargaining Structures and the Central Bank: Literature and Empirics; 3 The Real Balance Effect: Shortcomings; 4 Monetary Policy Transmission in a World of Endogenous Money; 5 Output and Prices in a World Without the Real Balance Effect; 6 The Central Bank: Restrictions in a World of Endogenous Money; 7 The Optimal Policy Mix and Logic of a Social Pact; 8 Conclusions and Outlook; Appendices: Monetary and Wage Policy in Standard Models; Notes and References
BibliographyIndex
Footnote:
Includes bibliographical references (p. 258-269) and index
Description:
Sebastian Dullien gives a novel explanation for unemployment and inflation in the Euro-Zone. He argues that unemployment stems from a lack of co-operation between unions and monetary authorities: In an economy with endogenous money as EMU, wage setters are responsible for price stability while the central bank is responsible for the level of output. Co-operation between both actors is necessary for high employment and low inflation. The current institutional set-up is found to be unable to assure cooperation