• Media type: E-Book
  • Title: Can Technology Solve the Principal-Agent Problem? Evidence from China’s War on Air Pollution
  • Contributor: Greenstone, Michael [Author]; He, Guojun [Other]; Jia, Ruixue [Other]; Liu, Tong [Other]
  • Corporation: National Bureau of Economic Research
  • Published: Cambridge, Mass: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2020
  • Published in: NBER working paper series ; no. w27502
  • Extent: 1 Online-Ressource; illustrations (black and white)
  • Language: English
  • DOI: 10.3386/w27502
  • Identifier:
  • Reproduction note: Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers
  • Origination:
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    Mode of access: World Wide Web
  • Description: We examine the introduction of automatic air pollution monitoring, which is a central feature of China's "war on pollution." Exploiting 654 regression discontinuity designs based on city-level variation in the day that monitoring was automated, we find that <i>reported</i> PM<sub>10</sub> concentrations increased by 35% immediately post-automation and were sustained. City-level variation in underreporting is negatively correlated with income per capita and positively correlated with true pre-automation PM<sub>10</sub> concentrations. Further, automation's introduction increased online searches for face masks and air filters, suggesting that the biased and imperfect pre-automation information imposed welfare costs by leading to suboptimal purchases of protective goods
  • Access State: Open Access