Description:
"Why Delegate? investigates the incentives to delegate and the risks that one takes in doing so. From mundane interactions like choosing a plumber to weightier tasks like the running of a country, and from recreational enjoyments to the protection of human rights, the world turns on delegation. Where it is successful, delegation brings efficiency, shared responsibility, and even happiness. Where it is not, it brings conflict, corruption, and an absence of accountability. One may hear of Saudi hit squads loose in Istanbul, rogue software engineers creating pollution scandals at Volkswagen, and individuals at FIFA selling the rights to host the World Cup, but one may question whether these individuals were out of control. One wonders about the chronic indifference of the Catholic Church to child abusers, and why those in charge ignore the misbehavior of security officials and even the war crimes of their soldiers. Is it can't control, or won't control? An understanding of the simple structure of the delegation relationship, more or less as economists have described it, simplifies a myriad of important and seemingly disparate problems in private and public life. Yet in the collision of principal-agent theory with the practice of delegation, there are further important insights to be found where the principal behaves in ways that are unexpected and puzzling to a rational-choice eye. A broader, more descriptively useful logic of delegation offers a fresh take on a wide variety of issues, whether corruption in sports organizations, war crimes, or the church's child abuse scandal"--