• Media type: E-Book
  • Title: Incentives and intertemporal behavioral spillovers : a two-period experiment on charitable giving
  • Contributor: Alt, Marius [Author]; Gallier, Carlo [Author]
  • Published: Mannheim, Germany: ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, 2021
  • Published in: Discussion paper ; 2021,10
  • Issue: This version: January, 2021
  • Extent: 1 Online-Ressource (61 Seiten); Illustrationen
  • Language: English
  • Identifier:
  • Keywords: Charitable giving ; Social preferences ; Experimental economics ; Behavioral spillovers ; Policy-making ; Economic incentives ; Graue Literatur
  • Origination:
  • Footnote:
  • Description: We test whether and, if so, how incentives to promote pro-social behavior affect the extent to which it spills over to subsequent charitable giving. To do so, we conduct a two-period artefactual field experiment to study repeated donation decisions of more than 700 participants. We vary how participants’ first pro-social behavior is incentivized by a wide range of fundraising interventions ranging from soft to hard paternalism. Our design allows us to decompose spillover effects into a pure spillover effect, which identifies the impact of previous pro-social behavior on subsequent donation decisions and a crowding effect, which captures the extent to which the spillover effects are affected by the incentives exerted on the previous pro-social behavior. We find evidence for negative spillover effects. Participants donate less if they completed a pro-social task prior to the donation decision. Most importantly, we find that the spillover effects depend on how the initial pro-social behavior has been incentivized. Especially participants who are incentivized to donate through social comparisons are more willing to give to charity thereafter compared to participants whose initial pro-social behavior is incentivized by monetary rewards. The variations in spillover effects are driven by participants’ perceived external pressure in the first pro-social decision.
  • Access State: Open Access