• Media type: E-Book
  • Title: Temporary Sequestration Credits : An Instrument for Carbon Bears
  • Contributor: Chomitz, Kenneth M. [Author]; Lecocq, Franck [Other]
  • Published: [S.l.]: SSRN, [2016]
  • Extent: 1 Online-Ressource (14 p)
  • Language: English
  • Origination:
  • Footnote: Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments December 2003 erstellt
  • Description: Temporary crediting of carbon storage is a proposed instrument that allows entities with emissions reductions obligations to defer some obligations for a fixed period of time. This instrument provides a means of guaranteeing the environmental integrity of a carbon sequestration project. But because the user of the temporary credit takes on the liability of renewing it, or replacing it with a permanent credit, the temporary credit must sell at a discount compared with a permanent credit. Chomitz and Lecocq show that this discount depends on the expected change in price of a permanent credit. Temporary credits have value only if restrictions on carbon emissions are not expected to tighten substantially. The intuition is illustrated by assessing the value of a hypothetical temporary sulfur dioxide sequestration credit using historical data on actual sulfur dioxide allowance prices.This paper - a product of Infrastructure and Environment, Development Research Group - is part of a larger effort in the group to assess policies for mitigating climate change
  • Access State: Open Access