Footnote:
In: Accounting Review, Vol. 88, No. 5, pp.. 1769-1804, November 2013
Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments October 19, 2012 erstellt
Description:
Extant research on voluntary disclosure about future prospects has focused on two forward-looking disclosure mechanisms: management forecasts and conference calls. This study examines the accelerated filing of material contracts as another type of future-related disclosure that involves no forecasting. I find that firms are more likely to accelerate material contract filings when forward-looking disclosures could lack credibility or arouse litigation concerns. However, for proprietary cost considerations, firms delay contract filings when facing high (low) product market competition from incumbents (potential entrants). I also find that accelerated contract filing is incrementally associated with lower information asymmetry. Overall, while presenting a cost-benefit trade-off that is distinctly different from forward-looking disclosures, accelerated contract filing has been an important alternative channel though which firms communicate future prospects to investors