Published in:Fisher College of Business Working Paper ; No. 2006-03-003
Extent:
1 Online-Ressource (42 p)
Language:
Not determined
DOI:
10.2139/ssrn.934857
Identifier:
Origination:
Footnote:
Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments February 24, 2008 erstellt
Description:
I study managers' risk-taking behavior and how it is affected by equity-based compensation. I find that in response to an exogenous increase in takeover protection in Delaware during the mid-1990s, managers lower firm risk by 6%. I also find that the decrease in firm risk is concentrated among firms with low managerial equity-based incentives, in particular, firms with low CEO portfolio sensitivity to stock return volatility. Furthermore, firms respond to the increased protection accorded by the regime shift by providing managers with greater incentives for risk-taking