• Media type: E-Book
  • Title: It Pays to Have Friends
  • Contributor: Hwang, Byoung-Hyoun [Author]; Kim, Seoyoung [Other]
  • Published: [S.l.]: SSRN, [2009]
  • Extent: 1 Online-Ressource (64 p)
  • Language: Not determined
  • Origination:
  • Footnote: In: Journal of Financial Economics (JFE), Forthcoming
    Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments August 1, 2008 erstellt
  • Description: Currently, a director is classified as independent if he/she has neither financial nor familial ties to the CEO or to the firm. We add another dimension: social ties. Using a unique data set, we find that 87% of boards are conventionally independent, but that only 62% are conventionally and socially independent. Furthermore, firms whose boards are conventionally and socially independent award a significantly lower level of compensation, exhibit stronger pay performance sensitivity, and exhibit stronger turnover-performance sensitivity than firms whose boards are only conventionally independent. Our results suggest that social ties do matter, and that consequently, a considerable percentage of the conventionally independent boards are substantively not
  • Access State: Open Access