Published in:Dresden Discussion Paper in Economics ; No. 04/08
Extent:
1 Online-Ressource (16 p)
Language:
Not determined
DOI:
10.2139/ssrn.1135680
Identifier:
Origination:
Footnote:
Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments March 8, 2008 erstellt
Description:
In this paper we challenge basic results of signaling models. In our banking model each project of a borrower is described by a continuous density of outcomes. Different density functions are classified according to second stochastisch dominance. Combining these features we find that in a banking model collateral is no longer in a position to signal the degree of riskiness of the borrower to the lender. In most cases the equilibrium is a pooling equilibrium