Published in:LSE STICERD Research Paper ; No. IS425
Extent:
1 Online-Ressource (82 p)
Language:
English
Origination:
Footnote:
Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments September 2001 erstellt
Description:
Dingman argues that the San Francisco settlement signaled the emergence of a new Pacific maritime order in which the United States Navy is the dominant naval force relying on significant bases in Japan. In particular, he focuses on the Yokosuka naval base whose retention was called for by the navy and became an important element in Washington's approach to the peace negotiations. Tozawa deals with the attitudes of the Yoshida government and the opposition parties to the peace negotiations and later to the ratification of the San Francisco Peace Treaty and the United States-Japan Security Pact. The points of difference were: whether Japan should negotiate with all the victors or with individual countries; whether Japan should observe disarmed neutrality; whether amendment to the Constitution was necessary. Cortazzi presents the perspective of a junior official in the United Kingdom Liaison Mission from October 1951. He gives an account of the activities of the British delegation to the San Francisco Conference and the conversations of Herbert Morrison and Robert Scott, especially with Prime Minister Yoshida. Lowe argues that British ministers and officials looked backward, influenced by economic, strategic and public opinion factors, the last referring to prisoners-of-war who had been treated harshly in Southeast Asia. The Labour government was worried over a probable revival in Japanese economic competition, referring particularly to textiles, shipping and the potteries. The British views of the treaty were much more critical of Japan than the USA. Foreign Secretary Herbert Morrison, anxious that the British contribution to the ultimate treaty should be properly acknowledged, agreed to be in San Francisco at the last moment for the signing of the peace treaty