Published in:University of Melbourne Dept. of Economics Research Paper ; No. 1036
Extent:
1 Online-Ressource (31 p)
Language:
English
DOI:
10.2139/ssrn.1153350
Identifier:
Origination:
Footnote:
Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments April 18, 2008 erstellt
Description:
A number of studies have shown that peer punishment can sustain cooperation in public good games. This paper shows that the format used to give subjects feedback is critical for the efficacy of punishment. Providing subjects with information about the earnings of their peers leads to lower contributions and earnings compared to a treatment in which subjects receive information about the contributions of their peers even though the feedback format does not affect incentives. The data suggest that this is because the feedback format acts as a coordination device, which influences the contribution standards that groups establish