Published in:Univ. of Copenhagen Dept. of Economics Discussion Paper ; No. 08-12
Extent:
1 Online-Ressource (21 p)
Language:
English
DOI:
10.2139/ssrn.1135256
Identifier:
Origination:
Footnote:
Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments 2008-04 erstellt
Description:
We introduce a description of the power structure which is inherent in a strategic game form using the concept of an interaction sheaf. The latter assigns to each open set of outcomes a set of interaction arrays, specifying the changes that coalitions can make if outcome belongs to this open set. The interaction sheaf generalizes the notion of effectivity functions which has been widely used in implementation theory, taking into consideration that changes in outcome may be sustained not only by single coalitions but possibly by several coalitions, depending on the underlying strategy choices. Also, it with not necessarily finite sets of outcomes, generalizing the results on solvability of game forms obtained in the finite case in Abdou and Keiding (2003)