Published in:IAFC Universita Bocconi Working Paper
Extent:
1 Online-Ressource (39 p)
Language:
Not determined
DOI:
10.2139/ssrn.683277
Identifier:
Origination:
Footnote:
Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments 2004 erstellt
Description:
In this paper we modify the approach pioneered by Barclay and Holderness (1989) and recently reproposed by Dyck and Zingales (2004) in order to measure the value of control in countries, like Italy, where transfer of control is regulated by law. Our estimates range from 12% to 14%, depending on the number of shares acquirers expect to buy on the market in force of the obligation to launch a tender offer.Our results confirm some theoretical predictions, namely a positive relation between the magnitude of the premiums and the degree of stock-pyramiding. In general terms, the magnitude of private benefit of control observed from our analysis is smaller then in previous studies.Our results suggest further research, aimed at testing similar methodologies in other countries in which transactions that convey control are driven by legal requirements, and at assessing if a relation actually exists between the appeal and the credibility of the acquirers, on one hand, and the observed magnitude of control premia, on the other