Published in:Advances in Austrian Economics, Editors Daniel J. D’Amico and Adam G. Martin, Forthcoming
Extent:
1 Online-Ressource (21 p)
Language:
English
DOI:
10.2139/ssrn.3676030
Identifier:
Origination:
Footnote:
Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments August 18, 2020 erstellt
Description:
Hayek's emphasis on the rule of law as a source of economic and political well-being underestimates how customary and informal institutions contribute to the common good in countries where the government is predatory. While customary governance can sometime be subjected to local tyrannies, it is often characterized by robust constraints on local decision-makers that enable good governance. Our analysis shows that Elinor Ostrom's studies of self-governance are a necessary complement to Hayek's theories of the path to well-being