Footnote:
In: Ion Marandici & Alexandru Leșanu. 2020. “The Political Economy of the Post-Soviet De Facto States: A Paired Comparison of Transnistria and the Donetsk People’s Republic.” Problems of Post-Communism, DOI: 10.1080/10758216.2020.1785317
Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments July 16, 2020 erstellt
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Description:
How can we explain the economic endurance of the post-Soviet unrecognized states? Drawing insights from the literature on economic institutions, rentier states, and patron-client relations, this article explores the resource extraction strategies of de facto states via a paired comparison of Transnistria (PMR) and the Donetsk People's Republic (DPR). The authors conceptualize the post-Soviet de facto states as rentier clients. In doing so, we identify and discuss the defining characteristics of two secessionist political economies – PMR's oligarchic model and DPR's provisional dirigiste system. Our study clarifies the mechanisms of economic endurance by showing how de facto states manage production, trade, tax and shape property rights regimes, while receiving the external rent from the Russian patron-state. The study also details the ways in which the patron-state became deeply embedded in the political economy of the two disputed regions