Footnote:
In: Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law blog (2020)
Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments May 4, 2020 erstellt
Description:
Even before the coronavirus plunged the world's financial markets, analysts and regulators had been describing the $1.2 to 1.5 trillion leveraged loan market as a ticking time bomb likely to play a role in causing the next financial crisis. Many have been denouncing problematic fundamentals in the current leveraged loan market and comparing them to those that caused the 2007 subprime mortgage crisis to spread into a full-blown financial crisis towards the second half of 2008. Two legal innovations in the world of corporate finance are the main anticipated culprits of a future financial meltdown: covenant-lite (or “cov-lite”) loans and Collateralized Loan Obligations (CLOs). Our paper argues that concerns of a systemic breakdown in the financial system as a result of cov-lite loans and CLOs may be overstated. To do this, we first draw from a seminal working paper by researchers at the Federal Reserve of Philadelphia that demonstrate that cov-lite loans are almost universally part of a syndication structure that binds borrowers to compliance with financial covenants. Secondly, the paper succinctly explains CLOs and compares them with similar structured finance and securitization products, such as Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs), CDO-squared and CDO-cubed, as well as with derivatives, such as synthetic CDOs and Credit Default Swaps (CDSs), all of which played a role in obscuring financial market fundamentals in the lead-up to the great financial crisis. Third, the paper briefly analyzes the latest stress test results and financial stability reports by regulators in charge of monitoring systemic risk in the banking and wider financial systems. Finally, the paper explores EBITDA add-backs, a product of contract law and accounting that have played an increasing role in large Leveraged Buyout (LBO) deals and could distort a lender's credit monitoring functions, but concludes that they are currently ignored in the ratings analysis of leveraged loans and CLOs