Footnote:
In: An edited version of the paper will be published as a chapter in “Global Shareholder Stewardship: Complexities, Challenges and Possibilities (Dionysia Katelouzou & Dan W. Puchniak eds, Cambridge University Press, Forthcoming)
Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments March 26, 2020 erstellt
Description:
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) introduced the Thai Stewardship Code in 2017 as an integral part of its corporate governance framework. The Thai Stewardship Code is expected to complement the Thai Corporate Governance Code (CG Code) by utilising the power of institutional investors to set a higher standard for boards of directors of listed companies. For over 20 years, the corporate governance performance of listed companies has developed substantially and is well-regarded internationally, especially in relation to the effectiveness of boards, corporate disclosure and transparency. This success in reforming the Thai corporate governance system is largely due to the active collaboration of all stakeholders following the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis (AFC). The SEC aims to continue this success with the Thai Stewardship Code but as this Chapter explains, this is unlikely. We divide this Chapter as follows. Part II introduces the CG Code and its success in Thailand as background for understanding the Thai Stewardship Code. Part III sheds light on the larger context of the Thai capital market to demonstrate that institutional investors in Thailand have had a limited impact as stewards. The Thai capital market is dominated by local private companies – especially family businesses – which often assume the role of de facto ‘stewards' in most Thai companies. Part IV analyses how institutional investors, especially asset management companies, have implemented the Thai Stewardship Code