• Media type: E-Book
  • Title: Contracting Costs and Reputational Contracts
  • Contributor: Badoer, Dominique C. [Author]; Emin, Mustafa [Other]; James, Christopher M. [Other]
  • Published: [S.l.]: SSRN, [2020]
  • Extent: 1 Online-Ressource (49 p)
  • Language: English
  • DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3536458
  • Identifier:
  • Keywords: Cov-Lite Loans ; Institutional Loans ; Private Equity Firms ; Reputational Contracting
  • Origination:
  • Footnote: Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments September 14, 2020 erstellt
  • Description: Reputational capital is a frequently cited attribute of private equity transactions. In this paper we construct a simple model to illustrate the relationship between reputational capital, covenants and loan spreads in the leveraged loan market. Our model predicts that reliance on reputational capital varies inversely with a sponsor's past loan performance and the efficiency of the enforcement formal contracts terms. Our model also predicts that for sponsored deals, spreads will be lower on Cov-Lite loans than loans with maintenance covenants. Using a large sample of leveraged loans originated between 2005 and 2018, we find evidence consistent with these predictions
  • Access State: Open Access