Published in:University of Chicago, Becker Friedman Institute for Economics Working Paper ; No. 2019-82
Extent:
1 Online-Ressource (38 p)
Language:
English
DOI:
10.2139/ssrn.3396730
Identifier:
Origination:
Footnote:
Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments July 23, 2020 erstellt
Description:
We analyze persuasion in a model, in which each receiver might buy a direct access to the sender's signal or to rely on her network connections to get it. For the sender, a higher slant increases the impact per direct receiver, yet diminishes the willingness of agents to receive information. Contrary to naive intuition, the optimal propaganda might target peripheral, rather than centrally-located agents, and is at its maximum levels when the probability that information flows between agents is close to zero or nearly one, but not in-between. The impact of the network density depends on this probability as well