Published in:Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 2019-009/VII
Extent:
1 Online-Ressource (41 p)
Language:
English
DOI:
10.2139/ssrn.3323647
Identifier:
Origination:
Footnote:
Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments June 31, 2020 erstellt
Description:
Using laboratory experiments, we compare the stability of bidding rings in the English auction and the first-price sealed-bid auction in a heterogeneous-value setting. In both a re-matching condition and a fixed-matching condition, we observe that biddings rings are more stable in the English auction than in the first-price sealed-bid auction. In both conditions, the first-price sealed-bid auction dominates the English auction in terms of average revenue and the revenue spread. The English auction outperforms the first-price sealed-bid auction in terms of efficiency