Footnote:
Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments May 28, 2020 erstellt
Description:
The story of conflict and cooperation has started millions of years ago, and now it is everywhere: In biology, computer science, economics, political science, and psychology. Examples include wars, airline alliances, trade, oligopolistic cartels, corruption, the evolution of species and genes, and team sports. However, neither cooperative games nor noncooperative games—in which "each player participant independently without collaboration with any of the others" (Nash, 1951)—fully capture the competition between and across individuals and groups, and the strategic partnerships that give rise to such groups. Thus, one needs to extend the noncooperative framework to study strategic games like scientific publication, which is a rather competitive game, yet (strategic) collaboration is widespread. In this paper, I propose a novel framework and a solution concept: I introduce the recursive backward induction solution in coalitional extensive-form games in which players are free to cooperate to coordinate their actions or act independently