Footnote:
Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments December 29, 2017 erstellt
Description:
Liberalization in the electricity markets has been characterized by oligopoly conditions and exercise of market power, largely studied in the empirical literature on the supply side. This paper provides a new contribution to the literature on the electricity market presenting a theoretical and empirical model to construct a competitive equilibrium, estimating market power both on the supply and demand side of the day-ahead electricity market. This model provides a useful analysis tool for the policy-maker to implement pro-competitive regulation, explicitly measuring the welfare loss associated with non-competitive market conditions. Results show the effect of non-competitive equilibria for the hourly markets in the period 2013-2014. In an ideal competitive market, prices would be lower than historical prices by about 2-5% and quantities would be higher by about 0.5-1%