Published in:Discussion Papers on Business and Economics, University of Southern Denmark, 6/2018
Extent:
1 Online-Ressource (23 p)
Language:
English
DOI:
10.2139/ssrn.3291364
Identifier:
Origination:
Footnote:
Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments November 27, 2018 erstellt
Description:
In this paper we explore the relationship between several value-like solution concepts for cooperative games with incomplete information and utility transfers in the form of sidepayments. In our model, state-contingent contracts are required to be incentive compatible, and thus utility might not be not fully transferable (as it would be in the complete information case). When we restrict our attention to games with orthogonal coalitions (i.e., which do not involve strategic externalities), our first main result states that Myerson's [Cooperative games with incomplete information. Int. J. Game Theory. (1984), 13, 69-96] generalization of the Shapley NTU value and Salamanca's [A generalization of the Harsanyi NTU value to games with incomplete information. (2016), HAL 01579898] extension of the Harsanyi NTU value are interim utility equivalent. If we allow for arbitrary informational and strategic externalities, our second main result establishes that the ex-ante evaluation of Myerson's solution equals Kalai and Kalai's [Cooperation in strategic games revisited. Q. J. Econ. (2013) 128, 917-966] cooperative-competitive value in two-player games with verifiable types