Published in:NHH Dept. of Business and Management Science Discussion Paper ; No. 2018/11
Extent:
1 Online-Ressource (25 p)
Language:
English
DOI:
10.2139/ssrn.3272182
Identifier:
Origination:
Footnote:
Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments September 24, 2018 erstellt
Description:
This article studies several variants of the location-routing problem using a cooperative game-theoretic framework. The authors derive characteristics in terms of subadditivity, convexity, and non-emptiness of the core. Moreover, for some of the game variants, it is shown that for facility opening costs substantially larger than the costs associated with routing, the core is always non-empty. The theoretical results are supported by numerical experiments aimed at illustrating the properties and deriving insights. Among others, it is observed that, while in general it is not possible to guarantee core allocations, in a huge majority of cases the core is non-empty