Published in:Bank of Italy Temi di Discussione (Working Paper) ; No. 1178
Extent:
1 Online-Ressource (47 p)
Language:
English
DOI:
10.2139/ssrn.3210748
Identifier:
Origination:
Footnote:
Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments June 15, 2018 erstellt
Description:
Public procurement outcomes depend on the ability of the procuring agency to select high-performing suppliers. Should public administrations be granted more or less discretion in their decision making? Using Italian data on municipal public works tendered in the period 2009-2013, we study how a reform extending the scope of bureaucrat discretion affects supplier selection. We find that the share of contracts awarded to firms having a local politician among its administrators or shareholders increases, while the (ex-ante) labor productivity of the winning firms decreases, thus suggesting a potential misallocation of public funds. These effects are concentrated among lower quality procurement agencies