Published in:CESifo Working Paper Series ; No. 7047
Extent:
1 Online-Ressource (26 p)
Language:
English
DOI:
10.2139/ssrn.3208081
Identifier:
Origination:
Footnote:
Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments May 18, 2018 erstellt
Description:
I study an indefinitely repeated game where firms differ in size. Attempts to form cartels in such an environment, for example by rationing outputs in a manner linked to firm size differences, have generally struggled. Any successful cartel has to set production shares in a manner that ensures no firm will defect. But this can require allocating sellers disproportionate shares, which in turn makes these tacit agreements difficult to create and enforce. I analyze some experimental evidence in support of this last proposition