Footnote:
Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments August 4, 2018 erstellt
Description:
In the presence of social dilemmas, cooperation is more difficult to achieve when populations are heterogeneous because of conflicting interests within groups. We examine cooperation in the context of a non-linear common pool resource game, in which individuals have unequal extraction capacities and have to decide on their extraction of resources from the common pool. We introduce monetary and non-monetary mechanisms in this environment. The two monetary mechanisms tax extraction and redistribute the tax revenue. These include a Pigovian per-unit tax mechanism and an increasing block tax that only taxes units extracted above the social optimum. Another mechanism varies the observability of individual decisions. We find that the two tax and redistribution mechanisms reduce extraction, increase efficiency and decrease inequality within groups. In contrast, observability impacts only the Baseline condition by encouraging free-riding instead of creating moral pressure to cooperate