Footnote:
Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments October 24, 2017 erstellt
Description:
As is well-known, firms' innovative efforts can benefit from information about past implementations of similar technologies by other firms ("technological knowledge"). In this paper, we examine the effect of technological knowledge on agency problems. We present robust evidence that technological knowledge makes shareholder rights more valuable since it improves the ability of outsiders to effectively monitor managerial decisions. In addition, the announcement of stricter board independence standards due to the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 has a positive effect on the value of weakly governed firms only when these firms operate better-known technologies. Firms with better-known technologies are more likely to experience performance-induced monitoring interventions such as performance-based CEO turnover and proxy fights. Overall, our evidence suggests that, in a knowledge economy, strong governance is an ever more important source of shareholder value