• Media type: E-Book
  • Title: How is the Trade-Off between Adverse Selection and Discrimination Risk Affected by Genetic Testing? Theory and Experiment
  • Contributor: Bardey, David [Author]; De Donder, Philippe [Other]; Mantilla, Cesar [Other]
  • Published: [S.l.]: SSRN, [2017]
  • Published in: Documento CEDE ; No. 2017-23
  • Extent: 1 Online-Ressource (49 p)
  • Language: English
  • DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2939685
  • Identifier:
  • Origination:
  • Footnote: Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments March 15, 2017 erstellt
  • Description: We compare two genetic testing regulations, Disclosure Duty (DD) and Consent Law (CL), in an environment where individuals choose to take a genetic test or not. DD forces agents to reveal the test results to their insurers, resulting in a discrimination risk. CL allows agents to withhold that information, generating adverse selection. We complement our model with an experiment. We obtain that a larger fraction of agents test under CL than under DD, and that the proportion of individuals preferring CL to DD is non-monotone in the test cost when adverse selection is set endogenously at its steady state level
  • Access State: Open Access