Published in:University of Zurich, Department of Economics, Working Paper ; No. 228, Revised version
Extent:
1 Online-Ressource (49 p)
Language:
English
DOI:
10.2139/ssrn.2787825
Identifier:
Origination:
Footnote:
Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments October 6, 2017 erstellt
Description:
We show that a one-off incentive to bias advice has persistent effects. In an experiment, advisers were paid a bonus to recommend a lottery which only risk-seeking individuals should choose to a less informed client. Afterwards, they had to choose for themselves and make a second recommendation to another client, without any bonus. These advisers choose the risky lottery and recommend it a second time up to six times more often than advisers in a control group who were never offered a bonus. These results are consistent with a theory we present which is based on advisers' image concerns of appearing incorruptible