Published in:CentER Discussion Paper Series ; No. 2016-041
Extent:
1 Online-Ressource (18 p)
Language:
English
DOI:
10.2139/ssrn.2848963
Identifier:
Origination:
Footnote:
Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments October 5, 2016 erstellt
Description:
In this paper we introduce and analyze the procedural egalitarian solution for transferable utility games. This new concept is based on the result of a coalitional bargaining procedure in which egalitarian considerations play a central role. The procedural egalitarian solution is the first single-valued solution which coincides with the constrained egalitarian solution of Dutta and Ray (1989) on the class of convex games and which exists for any TU-game