Published in:CESifo Working Paper Series ; No. 5639
Extent:
1 Online-Ressource (34 p)
Language:
English
DOI:
10.2139/ssrn.2717419
Identifier:
Origination:
Footnote:
Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments December 07, 2015 erstellt
Description:
We analyse whether, when and how local office-holders respond to the personal, economic incentives embedded in exogenously imposed population thresholds leading to an increased number and/or remuneration of local office-holders. Using data from all 589 Belgian municipalities over the period 1977-2014, local politicians are found to purposefully influence population growth through policy measures aimed at stimulating net in-migration when approaching important population thresholds. We provide evidence that strategic housing policy decisions – i.e. granting additional building permits early in the election cycle to maximize population growth just before the 'deadline' to surpass a population threshold – act as a key mechanism