• Media type: E-Book
  • Title: Debt Renegotiation and the Design of Financial Contracts
  • Contributor: Godlewski, Christophe J. [Author]
  • imprint: [S.l.]: SSRN, [2016]
  • Extent: 1 Online-Ressource (49 p)
  • Language: English
  • DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2715106
  • Identifier:
  • Origination:
  • Footnote: Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments January 13, 2016 erstellt
  • Description: I study the impact of bank loan renegotiation on the design of financial contracts. Debt renegotiation can be beneficial for borrowers and lenders but its impact on the design of financial contracts is less clear. However, contract design is crucial for borrower's investment, operating and financing policies. I find that the design of renegotiated credit agreements is not homogenous. Main renegotiation packages contain amendments to loan amount and maturity. I show that secured loans with longer maturities experience broader amendments. Creditors' friendly environment and the presence of reputable, sound, and profitable lenders have a similar effect
  • Access State: Open Access