Published in:University Ca' Foscari of Venice, Dept. of Economics Research Paper Series ; No. 33
Extent:
1 Online-Ressource (34 p)
Language:
English
DOI:
10.2139/ssrn.2713002
Identifier:
Origination:
Footnote:
Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments December 21, 2015 erstellt
Description:
The incentive scheme selected in a laboratory experiment might trigger different type of behavior in participants. This paper is an attempt to screen the strategies adopted by agents in a bargaining game when buyer and seller have partly conflicting interests and are asymmetrically informed. We allow participants to choose the incentive scheme through which they will be paid at the end of the experiment controlling for past experience and individual characteristics. It is well known that payment method is highly correlated to the risk preferences shown by individuals, but little research is devoted to the analysis of the behavior induced by Random Lottery Incentive scheme (RLI for short) and Cumulative Scheme payment (CS for short) both on individual and social results. This paper aims to fill the gap