Published in:University of Milan Bicocca Department of Economics, Management and Statistics Working Paper ; No. 309
Extent:
1 Online-Ressource (28 p)
Language:
English
DOI:
10.2139/ssrn.2660322
Identifier:
Origination:
Footnote:
Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments September 14, 2015 erstellt
Description:
The effect of constitutional structures (such as the effect of a presidential vs. a parliamentary system) over policy outcomes has been widely studied in the economic literature. In this paper, we investigate whether stable parliamentary systems and unstable parliamentary systems behave differently in terms of the policy outcomes they implement. We show that accounting for the stability of parliamentary systems generates results that are more robust compared to the previous literature. More precisely, we find that stable parliamentary systems are significantly different both from presidential and from unstable parliamentary ones. Moreover, we show that this result is robust to changes in the set of countries, and to changes in the definition of stability. Finally, we discuss how these results are consistent with the presence of a selection effect in parliamentary systems