Published in:University of Milan Bicocca Department of Economics, Management and Statistics Working Paper ; No. 290
Extent:
1 Online-Ressource (29 p)
Language:
English
DOI:
10.2139/ssrn.2548392
Identifier:
Origination:
Footnote:
Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments January 12, 2015 erstellt
Description:
Constitutional structures shape politicians' behaviour and hence policy outcomes through the di fferent incentive schemes at work. In this paper we analyse these mechanisms in parliamentary and presidential systems. Such a comparison is carried over by analysing how the two systems are able to select the effi cient policy in presence of asymmetric information. The constitutional structures di ffer in that the policy proposal in parliamentary democracies is observable and confi dence-dependent. The main findings suggest that the parliament responds to the incentive scheme better in presidential systems due to less uncertainty that legislators face over their term limit. However, the parliamentary system induces the executive to behave more e fficiently due to selection and disciplining e ffects