Published in:U of Michigan Law & Econ Research Paper ; No. 12-022
Extent:
1 Online-Ressource (37 p)
Language:
English
DOI:
10.2139/ssrn.2109739
Identifier:
Origination:
Footnote:
Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments June 3, 2015 erstellt
Description:
Using actions with both an SEC investigation and a class action as our baseline, we compare the targeting of SEC-only investigations with class action-only lawsuits. Looking at measures of information asymmetry, we find that investors in the market perceive greater information asymmetry following the public announcement of the underlying violation for class action-only lawsuits compared with SEC-only investigations. Turning to sanctions, we find that the incidence of top officer resignation is greater for class action-only lawsuits relative to SEC-only investigations. Our findings are consistent with the private enforcement targeting disclosure violations at least as precisely (if not more) than SEC enforcement