• Media type: E-Book
  • Title: SEC Investigations and Securities Class Actions : An Empirical Comparison
  • Contributor: Choi, Stephen J. [Author]; Pritchard, Adam C. [Other]
  • Published: [S.l.]: SSRN, [2015]
  • Published in: U of Michigan Law & Econ Research Paper ; No. 12-022
  • Extent: 1 Online-Ressource (37 p)
  • Language: English
  • DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2109739
  • Identifier:
  • Origination:
  • Footnote: Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments June 3, 2015 erstellt
  • Description: Using actions with both an SEC investigation and a class action as our baseline, we compare the targeting of SEC-only investigations with class action-only lawsuits. Looking at measures of information asymmetry, we find that investors in the market perceive greater information asymmetry following the public announcement of the underlying violation for class action-only lawsuits compared with SEC-only investigations. Turning to sanctions, we find that the incidence of top officer resignation is greater for class action-only lawsuits relative to SEC-only investigations. Our findings are consistent with the private enforcement targeting disclosure violations at least as precisely (if not more) than SEC enforcement
  • Access State: Open Access