Footnote:
Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments July 22, 2014 erstellt
Description:
This paper further examines the development of the relevant mechanisms available for bank recovery and resolution, in special consideration of the recent Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive and the SRM Regulation as one part of the current regulatory activity of the EU. The Directive requires financial institutions to submit recovery and resolution planning (living wills) to the authorities and applies resolution tools, such as bail-in, transfer and assumption, bridge bank etc. These resolution tools are analyzed in comparison to ordinary bankruptcy proceedings. Albeit there being the possibility of systemic risks like the domino-effect, bankruptcy proceedings have proved to be far less of a negative option than commonly expected, especially compared to bailouts. However, considering banks are heavily regulated and that their "product" is providing financial liability itself, there is definitely a need for a level of adjustment and correction towards ordinary bankruptcy. The bail-in tool as a proposed measure by the directive considers political and systemic instabilities but it is doubtful whether fundamental bankruptcy policies, such as the pari passu principle, will be ensured in practice